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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
plicability of declaratory relief. Sigal v. Wise (1932) 114 Conn. 297,
158 At]. 891. In that case it was said that one great purpose of the
acts is to enable parties to settle their differences in advance of any in-
vasion of rights so as to avoid the expense and disturbance of lawsuits.
. . . "Fully to carry out" these purposes "it is sometimes necessary to
determine rights which will arise or become complete only in the con-
tingency of some future happening." In Post v. Metropolitan Life In-
surance Co. (1929) 237 N. Y. Supp. 64, it was said that the Declaratory
Judgment Statute "was designed to supply the need for a form of action
that would set controversies at rest before they led to the repudiation of
obligations, the invasion of rights, and the commission of wrongs. The
benevolent purposes of the statute should not be thwarted by narrow and
technical construction."
J. W. '37.
EvMENCF-MOTION PIcTunsS.-The plaintiff sued for damages for in-
juries to his nervous system, claiming total and permanent disability, and
his physician testified that the plaintiff's condition "will get progressively
worse" and "will manifest more organic signs as time progresses." Defend-
ant introduced motion pictures taken while plaintiff was'unaware, showing
him doing various chores, including taking down a cherry tree ten feet high.
This evidence was held admissible to prove the complete manual dexterity
of the plaintiff and the likelihood of his speedy rehabilitation. Smalley v.
New York Central Ry. Co. (D. C., E. D. N. Y., No. L-6235, Feb. 11, 1935)
U. S. Law Week, Feb. 26, 1935, p. 14.
During the earlier development of motion pictures the courts hesitated
to recognize their validity as evidence. The first New York case was Gibson
v. Gunn (1923) 202 N. Y. Supp. 19, a suit by a dancer for personal in-
juries. As the defendant, in order to prove that the actual damage he had
caused was slight, relied upon the fact that before the accident the plaintiff's
leg had been amputated, the plaintiff showed a motion picture, portraying
her in various dances, proving that in spite of her artificial leg she had been
an expert dancer before her injury by the defendant. The appellate court
held such evidence inadmissible for the reasons that motion pictures in them-
selves present fertile field for exaggeration of one's emotions and actions,
that plaintiff had offered no evidence as to how this picture had been pre-
pared, and that the evidence was irrelevant and hearsay. Thus, under
the first reason given, it would seem that all motion pictures must be ex-
cluded, a view limited by later decisions. Despite the court's unsupported
statement to the contrary, it appears clear that the evidence was neither
irrelevant nor hearsay.
Later cases excluding motion pictures as evidence based their decisions
on grounds not in conflict with Smalley v. N. Y. Gent. By., supra. In Mas-
sachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Worthy, (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) 9 S. W.
(2nd) 388, an action on an insurance policy, the court sustained exclusion
of motion pictures disproving plaintiff's claim of total disability, for the
reason that the defendant had failed to identify them or verify their ac-
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curacy. And in State, for Use of China, v. United By. & Elec. Co. of Bal-
timore (Md. 1932) 159 Alt. 916, the court sustained the exclusion of motion
pictures for irrelevancy.
It was not until 1934, apparently, that an appellate court held that in a
particular case before it motion pictures would be admissible. In Boyarsky
v. Zimmerman Corp. (1934) 270 N. Y. Supp. 134, a case similar in facts
to the Smalley case, the court held it error to exclude motion pictures
disproving plaintiff's claim of incapacity, pointing out the rapid develop-
ment of motion pictures and their remarkable accuracy. By dicta, the
court held that the rules as to the admission of photographs were applicable
to motion pictures, which rules are recognized to be: 1) The pictures must
be relevant. Hooks v. Gent. Storage & Transfer Co. (Ark. 1933) 63 S. W.
(2nd) 527; Hampton v. Ry. (1897) 120 N. C. 534, 27 S. E. 96; and Verrann
v. Baird (1889) 150 Mass. 142, 22 N. E. 630; compare with Gibson v. Gunn,
supra, where this rule was misapplied, and State, for Use of Chima, v.
United Ry. & Elec. Co. of Baltimore, supra, where it was correctly applied.
2) They must not excite sympathy or unfair prejudice. Cooper v. R. Co.
(1893) 54 Minn. 379, 56 N. W. 42; Selleck v. Janesville (1899) 104 Wis. 307,
80 N. W. 944. 3) They must be an accurate representation. Riggs v. Met-
ropolitan St. Ry. Co. (1909) 216 Mo. 304, 115 S. W. 969. Compare with
Gibson w. Gunn, supra. 4) They must be verified by a witness who is quali-
fied by observation to speak. Mayor, etc., of Baltimore V. State (1918) 132
Md. 113, 103 Atl. 426; Hindson v. Ashby (1896) 2 Ch. 1, 65 L. J. Ch. 515;
Pace v. Cochran (1915) 144 Ga. 261, 86 S. W. 934; U. S. Shipping Board
v. St. Albans Ship (1931) A. C. 632. Note that Gibson v. Gunn, supra, was
justified upon this ground by the court in the Boyarsky case. The
decision in Mass. Bond. & Ins. Co. v. Worthy, supra, rested squarely upon
this ground. 5) Whether the pictures have been properly verified is a ques-
tion for the discretion of the court Hassam v. Stafford Co. (1909) 82 Vt.
444, 74 Atl. 197; and Mass. Bond. & Ins. Co. v. Worthy, supra.
A question arises as to the applicability of the best evidence rule. An
analysis of the motion picture cases already decided will show that the
rule is not applicable in these particular cases. But should the plaintiff
offer a motion picture to show the extent of his incapacity when it would
be proper for the jury to observe him in court, the picture should be ex-
cluded as not the best evidence obtainable. Photograph cases adopting this
rule are: MacLean v. Scripps (1893) 52 Mich. 214, 218; Sharp v. State(1927) 115 Neb. 737, 214 N. W. 643; Farina v. Com. (1925) 212 Ky. 303.
X-ray photographs are regarded as best evidence. Daniels v. Iowa City,
(1921) 191 Ia. 811, 183 N. W. 415. For a discussion as to the application of
the best evidence rule to photostatic copies of books and documents, see note,
33 Mich. Law Rev. 611.
Sound pictures will present an interesting problem, for the objection of
hearsay will be present in all cases where there is an assertion offered for
the purpose of proving its truth. Cases allowing phonograph records as
evidence are: Loring v. Boston Elev. Ry. Co. (1905) Superior Court of Suf-
folk Co., Mass., Boston Transcript, Dec. 12, phonograph records allowed to
show noise made by defendant's trains; and Boyne C. G. & A. R. Co. v.
Anderson (1901) 146 Mich. 328, 109 N. W. 429.
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Another issue will arise in cases where the motion pictures are offered
merely to illustrate the evidence. Photographs for this purpose were ad-
mitted in Smith v. Territory (1902) 11 Okla. 669, 69 Pac. 805; and Fulton
v. Chouteau County Farmers' Co. (Mont. Sup. Ct. 1934) 37 Pac. (2nd)
1025. For further discussion as to the general problem of motion pictures,
see note, 36 Law Notes 108-10, 2 Wigmore on Evidence (2nd ed., 1923) sec.
798, and R. C. Beckett, Motion Pictures in Evidence (1932) 27 Il1. Law
Rev. 424-7. J. C. L. '36.
INFANTS-JUVENILE COURTS-JURISDICTION OVER CRIMMs.-Daniecki was
indicted, tried, and convicted for murder in a criminal court. Daniecki peti-
tions for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that at the time of the
murder he was a minor under the age of 16, and should have been tried by
a juvenile court. A statute had vested the juvenile court with exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and determine all cases against a child under 16 who
was charged with committing any offense or act for which he could be
prosecuted; all such cases were to be tried by a judge without a jury; it was
further provided that no child could be tried for a crime except with the
consent of the judge of the juvenile court, who in his discretion might trans-
fer the case to a criminal court. Comp. St. of New Jersey Supp. 1930, see.
53. Held, the statute is unconstitutional as regards indictable offenses where
the constitutional right to trial by jury exists. The vice of the statute
is in creating a juvenile court to try all manner of crime and subjecting
the culprit to a possible trial by a judge without a jury. Ex parte Daniechi,
(New Jersey, Feb., 1935), 177 Atl. 91.
The statutes of the various states vary as to the forum in which the
juvenile delinquents are to be tried. The majority of the states leave the
matter to the discretion of the judge of the juvenile court except where a
serious felony is involved. State v. Alexander (Okla. Cr. 1921), 196 Pac.
969; Johnson v. Cor. (1917), 176 Ky. 339, 195 S. W. 818. He may transfer
the case to a criminal court or keep it in the juvenile court. The basis for
his decision is whether the child is incorrigible or not. Powell v. State
(1932), 96 Ala. 936, 141 So. 201; Ashley v. Commonwealth (1930), 236 Ky.
543, 33 S. W. (2d) 614; Wigging v. State (Tenn. 1927), 289 S. W. 498;
People -vs. Ross (1926), 235 Mich., 433, 209 N. W. 663; State v. Burnett
(N. C. 1920), 102 S. E. 711; People v. Woeff (1920), 182 Cal. 728, 190
Pac. 22; Ex fparte Powell (1912), 6 Okla. Cr. 495, 120 Pac. 1022; State ex
rel. Johnson v. Quigg (Fla. 1922), 90 So. 695. In these states the juvenile
court is vested with exclusive original jurisdiction except in serious felony
cases and if a minor gets into a criminal court it is the duty of the crim-
inal court to transfer the case immediately to the juvenile court. Compton
v. Commonwealth (Ky. 1922), 240 S. W. 36; Ex parte Hightower (Okla.
1907), 165 Pac. 624.
The old idea of "guilt" and the right to trial by jury to ascertain guilt
still prevails in some of the states as to the delinquent. In these states the
minor has a right to trial by jury on demand. However, in cases of serious
felony a criminal trial would be mandatory. Colorado provides for a jury
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